THE TRIPLE CONSTRAINTS ANOMALY

You cannot possibly be a project manager and not have heard of the term 'Triple Constraints', and the surest sign that you are a novice project manager is your belief that the Triple Constraints is made up a 3 things.

That is one of the odd things about this term.  Originally, it was indeed about three constraints: Cost, Time, and Scope – project and programme managers have to deliver the goods (Scope), within the budget (Cost), within the schedule (Time).

Later, thinkers thought to add 'Quality' because well, sure, you can deliver the goods, but are the goods you deliver up-to-spec?. So the Triple Constraints began to consist of four items.  There are some heretics (or perhaps they are prophets of wisdom) who insist that Quality is just part of Scope, and ought not be considered separately from the other.  The argument is, if you delivered 600 green umbrellas rather than the required 600 red umbrellas, it is not a 'Quality' problem but a Scope problem – you simply didn't deliver what was asked for.

Project managers with more than a week experience, began to realise that despite their personal charm, the world doesn't revolve around them or their naive assumptions. 

Things go wrong.

"We need to add another constraint - Risk", came the chorus. And so the Triple Constraints became five (and have to be redrawn as a pentagon – we are not geometrical ignorami, after all)

Courageous project and programme managers soon began to point out their specialty: delivering goods within the constraints of time, cost, scope, quality, and risks. There is no need to be mean-spirited by reminding them that postmen and newspaper delivery kids and mothers and housewives, have been doing the same since the invention of anything.

But no matter how well we think we manage the five constraints, projects still tend to head south, and so we need another constraint to lay the blame on.

Resources.

"Surely Resources are a constraint!" came the battle-cry of the project and programme manager. "Even if I have a budget of $50 million if I cannot find Fortran programmers, my Fortran project cannot succeed." And of course, when they burn up my $50 million without delivering anything, they can point to the incompetent resources they had to work with. 

But let's take a step back (after first checking we are not on the edge of a cliff; risk management in action).

We can take the view that the constraints are about what a project manager has to deliver against. Or we can take the view that the constraints are 'natural' limitations that enterprises have to balance when deciding which projects to undertake.

We want to finish the project as soon as possible so we can reap the benefits and start other projects as well. But to finish faster means applying more resources. This is a natural constraint in our world.

We want to do it right the first time, but it will mean more time and more cost, so we may need to cut a little bit of scope here and there. Another natural constraint.

We want to deliver the project as cheaply as possible, but if we put a limited number of resources will take the project that much longer to finish. Another natural constraint.

I think the Triple Constraints are about having the enterprise (not the project manager) balance between the 3 (not six) constraints.  The project manager, for his part have to deliver the Triple Constraints while working through the constraints of Risks and Resources. (Quality is part of Scope).

Risk Velocity

Someone asked about ‘risk velocity’ in the Linkedin discussion groups.  She was asking about its use as a criteria in prioritising risks. But she was also interested about the term itself. Why ‘velocity’?  What did the (so far anonymous) coiners of the term have in mind?  The original poster notes that definitions of the term were very vague. 

Subsequent comments from the other posters bear this out – it seems everyone had their own thoughts about what risk velocity meant.  I myself had none, having not heard of this term before.

One poster suggested that risk velocity is about the ‘timeframe within which the risk event might occur’.  That is, ‘risk proximity’ (which begs the question – what’s the difference between the two?).

Another poster posited that risk velocity is not the proximity of the risk itself, but the time to impact of its consequences.  That is, how much time do we have before the consequences happen after the risk occurs?  This poster rather correctly points out that the common measure of risk, which is “probability x impact”, tells us nothing about when either the risk or its impact might occur.

A third poster comments that he sometimes uses ‘Velocity of Risk’ to describe the state of the financial market.  Presumably, during a volatile situation, the velocity is higher.  This is somewhat akin to wind velocity, blowing more violently in a hurricane, and much more calmly in normal weather.

A commenter named Val brings forward her own use of the term. If I understand her correctly, she uses risk velocity to describe how the risk grows the longer it takes to mitigate its occurrence.  Her example tells me she is talking about the impact growing the longer we wait to mitigate. 

Someone named Peter chimes in, properly noting that ‘velocity’ is a vector – a measure containing both magnitude and direction.  He posits that perhaps the term includes (or should include) the idea of something that is moving in a certain direction. Perhaps we are running directly into the risk (or the risk is bearing directly towards us), perhaps it might be a glancing blow, perhaps it may bypass us.

Yet another poster writes that her use of risk velocity is about assessing the likelihood of an event in a specific timeframe, that is, assessing that an event has a 50% chance of happening in the next 3 months, is much more useful than merely saying it has a 50% chance of happening.   While certainly sound, I just don’t see that this has any connection at all about velocity.

In a later post the original poster reveals her own understanding,  which is that risk velocity was about the rate of change of the likelihood, and not at all about the impact.

There were dozens of other further comments, too many to note here.  Some went beyond the original question, but providing interesting insights.

But what of it?  What about risk velocity?  Can it be used to rank risks?  I think the idea of getting a  good understanding of when a risk might occur (risk proximity) and how soon the impact will happen after the risk event occurs is sound, but very inadequate. 

First, which impact are we talking about?  The initial impact?  The follow-on impacts?  The maximum impact?  You need a good understanding of the impacts, when they will occur, how they will occur, in which order, and so on.  Some impacts will occur immediately, some will occur later.  How can a single risk velocity number capture these characteristics?

Risk velocity, as a singular number to be used for ranking risk events according to when their impact is to occur after the event, might appear to be simple and useful.  I think it has a use as a label to allow us to find those risks which may have a early impact, but as a prioritising value, I find it to be too ambiguous and potentially misdirecting.

Ten Lessons from ‘Intellectuals and Society’

Thomas Sowell’s ‘Intellectuals and Society’ describes what drives intellectuals, and what damages they have produced – and continue to produce – to society.  Typical of his other works, this one cites many references to back up its claims.  This is not a book written by solitary pondering.  Sowell could not have written this book without considerable time and effort exerted at compiling sources.

The ten lessons listed below are not the ten most important things this book says.  They are not even necessarily the most important things I learned (the items are not even listed in any order of importance).

I simply wanted to list down ten things I learned while read this book.

1. Special Knowledge – Many types of knowledge exist. Intellectuals possess a ‘special’ kind of knowledge that is not found in the general population. But this knowledge is taken (often wrongly) to be more important than ‘mundane’ knowledge.  Intellectuals often stray very far from their area of speciality, forgetting that knowledge does not necessarily travel with them as they cross other territories.  Chess grandmasters may be the pinnacle of intellectual skills in that game, but they themselves recognise that expertise in chess does not translate to expertise in politics or economics or indeed something closer, like poker.  Intellectuals seem to brush away this fact.  Even the very smartest intellectual possesses only a minuscule fraction of the knowledge of the general public.  Even taken collectively, the total knowledge of intellectuals is dwarfed by the knowledge of everyone else as a whole. 
   
2. Who Intellectuals Are – for the book’s intent, intellectuals are people whose work ‘begins and ends with ideas.’  Intellectuals do not build anything.  They just produce and propagate ideas.  There are many other professionals who engage in work requiring very high mental demands, but whose work does not end with ideas and therefore Sowell does not regard them as intellectuals (for the purpose of this book).  This latter kind include surgeons and doctors, engineers and architects, lawyers and business men, scientists and mathematicians (although Bertrand Russell when acting as a non-mathematician is included in the list of intellectuals).
   
3. Verbal Virtuosity – intellectuals very often frame reality with an inventive play of words to recast this reality into what it isn’t. They do not necessarily do this on purpose.  Very often it just happens as a result of an intellectual’s ignorance of the subject matter. Sowell gives the example of intellectuals calling for the abolition of ‘mandatory retirement.’ He says there has practically never been such a thing.  People who were let go by they employers due to age have always been free to work elsewhere.  They were not required by any law to not work anymore.
   
4. Intellectuals Have a Depp Need to be Recognised – because intellectuals do not do helpful work daily, they have a need to come up with new, exotic, exciting ideas. Whether there is proof that these ideas work is almost ignored.  They want to change the world.
   
5. Intellectuals can be Epic Fools – Sowell provides evidence that intellectuals have been supporters of Stalin, of Hitler, of unilateral disarmament in the face of Nazi Germany rearming, and many other examples.
   
6. The Media Does not Report on Reality – if you think about it, if the media reported only facts, people would not find them very interesting.  The media, like the intellectuals, have an interested in the new, exciting, and exotic.   Sowell unfortunately does not give guidance on where can find the facts, if the media cannot really be trusted.
   
7. Intellectuals Often Ignore Empirical Evidence – Intellectuals judge ideas, not by empirical evidence of its goodness, but by characteristics like ‘novelty’, ‘exciting', ‘complex’
   
8. Social Vision – Intellectuals have a ‘vision of the anointed’ , a vision of a world unable to improve without their (the intellectuals) wisdom and intelligence.  This vision Sowell contrasts with the ‘tragic vision’, where there is no solution – everything is a trade-off, civilisation people just lead their lives making their own choices in a world where civilised society is a veneer over barbarism forever threatening to spill out – and we can’t do much about that except strive to contain it.  This section is one of the harder parts for me to side with Sowell.  Much of society’s progress (material progress at least) is due to capitalists who have a vision of the world and who have staked their reputation and assets trying to put that vision (I would put the likes of Thomas Edison and Henry Ford, even though Sowell does not mention them).  Perhaps I have not understood it well yet.
   
9. Don’t Let the Intellectuals Run Your War – Sowell blames the intellectuals for the stunning weakness of France’s performance in World War II, despite it material military advantage.  He blames France’s military failure on the supine psychological attitude of the French, inculcated into its youth by the intellectuals running the education system.  Had it not been for pragmatic leaders like Winston Churchill,  intellectuals would have had Britain disarm completely in the naive hope that Hitler would do the same.  (Had that happened, I think Western Europe would be completely either under Nazi or Soviet rule)
   
10. Judges Shouldn’t be Making Laws but They are – Laws are supposed to be made by the Legislative branch of the government, and judges are to judges individual cases in light of those laws.  Judges sometimes rule in ways that make their rulings applicable ex post facto.